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Corporate governance (CG) studies have mostly focused on highly dispersed 
corporations. However, there is an important need for research exploring the 
governance structure of family-owned firms. The main characteristics that distinguish 
the family firm from the other types of corporations are the presence of one or more 
controlling family and the involvement of the owners in the management. Family firm 
is the most common form of business in Greece. Hence, the governance structures and 
the performance of the family firms affect the growth opportunities of the capital 
market. The aim of the paper is to explore the main aspects of CG of family-owned 
listed companies in Greece. For this purpose, we apply a specific CG rating 
methodology, using five core CG criteria to distinguish family from non-family firms: 
shareholders' rights and obligations; transparency, disclosure of information and 
auditing; board of directors; CEO and executive management and corporate social 
responsibility and corporate governance commitment. The overall research objective 
of the study is to develop a CG rating methodology on the current state of corporate 
governance in Greece. Each firm is rated among the 120 total number of companies 
(both family-owned and widely-held). The results disclose the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing corporate governance framework of the family-owned 
firms and provide specific policy recommendations.  
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The family firm is an important form of business in many countries. In Continental 
Europe, a relatively small number of families controls a sizable number of 
corporations. Families control 43.9 per cent of Western European firms
1 (Facio and 
Lang, 2001). Even in large public companies, in many countries including the US
2, 
concentrated ownership is very common (La Porta et al., 1999). In countries with 
dispersed ownership structure (mainly the US and the UK) the separation of 
ownership and control, as posed by Berle and Means (1932), refers to the inherent 
conflicting interests of opportunistic managers and owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Williamson 1985). Investors usually use their exit options 
if they disagree with the management or if they are disappointed by the company's 
performance, signalling - through share prices reduction - the necessity for managers 
to improve firm performance (Hirschman, 1970). In countries where the principal 
ownership structure is control by a family, typically playing an active role in 
management, the agency problem of corporate governance (CG) sight as how to align 
the interests of strong controlling shareholder(s) and weak minority shareholders 
(Becht, 1997). The risk of insider expropriation is the main concern that potential 
investors face when a few large shareholders own and manage the firm (Leechor, 
1999)  
 
CG has mainly focused on highly dispersed corporations. Since little research has 
been done to the issues of CG in family firms (Berghe and Carchon, 2003; Melin and 
Nordqvist, 2000; Wortman, 1994; Daily and Dollinger, 1992), additional research is 
necessary. In this paper we explore the governance characteristics of the family-
controlled listed firms in Greece. The main characteristics that distinguish the family 
firm from the other types of corporations are the presence of one or more controlling 
family and the involvement of the owners in the management. Greek family groups 
are important in the country. Families often use the holding companies as investment 
vehicles to control indirectly a variety of listed and non-listed companies in different 
industries. Hence, the governance structures and the performance of the family firms 
affect largely the growth opportunities of the Greek capital market. We use the CG 
rating results of: "CG rating methodology for the ASE listed companies"
3 (Tsipouri 
and Xanthakis; 2004, Xanthakis et al., 2003). 
 
 
Literature on family firms and corporate governance  
 
The principal characteristic among the majority of the family firms is that the main 
owner (family) is usually involved in the key-decision-making of the firm (Melin and 
Nordqvist, 2000; Daily and Dollinger, 1992). This feature is crucial for the 
governance analysis of the family firms. Melin and Nordqvist (2000), define CG in 
family firms as "the processes, principles, structures, and relationships that help the 
                                                         
1 Families control 71.6 per cent of companies in Germany, while in the UK, where family control is 
less pronounced, they control 33.8 per cent of companies (Facio and Lang, 2001). 
2 Kang (2000) calculated that families control as much as 30 per cent of the largest public US 
companies and involve in management of as much as one third of these.   
3 A project funded by the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).   3
owner of the firm realize his particular vision, goals and objectives". Particular 
emphasis is given on the actual way that the owner family exercises its power and 
influence over the firm (Melin and Nordqvist, 2000; Pettigrew, 1992). Family can be 
a real source of competitive advantage for the firm (Mustakallio and Valkamo, 2002; 
Cadbury, 2000). A very common argument favoring family firms is that agency costs 
are minimized, since the owner (family) and the management are the same person or 
at least different persons coming from the same family (Randoy et al., 2003; Schulze 
et al., 2003; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Long-term 
perspective, family commitment and clear identity are also just some of the strengths 
points associated with family firms (Cadbury, 2000). Altruistic behavior and trust can 
also produce many advantages in the family firm's context, e.g. collective ownership 
by all family members working in the firm, reduction of information asymmetries 
among family members and commitment of corporate leaders to the firm's long-term 
performance and strategy (Berghe and Carchon, 2003; Kang, 2000; and Stark and 
Falk 1998). For instance, De Paola and Scoppa (2001) believe that altruism within 
family firm's members could produce superior contracts by the firm.  
 
On the other hand family-owned firms are associated with costs and inefficiencies. 
Confusing family and business matters, family owners could favor family interests 
over the firm's interests (e.g. non-family shareholders), because of loyalty toward 
family (Randoy and Jenssen, 2003; Schulze et al, 2003). It has been also argued that 
altruism in family relationships can produce inefficiencies. Family firms may 
encourage internal labor market schemes favoring family members (within-family 
promotion), rather than competent recruitment processes. Reducing the quality of 
applicants for executive managerial positions may eventually cause significant 
monitoring cost (Berghe and Carchon, 2003). Moreover, when family members are 
promoted, while non-family members receive fewer opportunities, the latter have 
incentives to be engaged in shirking and opportunistic behaviors (Baldridge and 
Schulze, 1999). The problem of assessing the family's insiders is also evolved in 
family firms. It is easy to understand that with a family hierarchy, assessment 
practices based on business competence are difficult to apply (Cadbury, 2000).  
 
Good governance practices family firms will be able to face their risks and to prosper 
in an environment of intense competition. The importance of bringing external board 
members', establishing independent board committees, hiring professional managers 
and securing efficient succession in family firms are focused by the relevant literature 
(Schwartz and Barnes, 1991; Huse, 1990; Jonovic, 1989). Finally, Melin and 
Nordqvist (2000) attempting to fill an important gap in research, focused on the 
structural and the processual elements of CG in family firms in order to better 
understand how family firms are governed and managed. Their study shows that the 
combination of influential actors and the strategic arena may be important in the 
strategy process of the family firm (Melin and Nordqvist, 2000). 
 
 
The corporate governance framework in Greece  
 
The family firm is an important and common form of business organisation in Greece. 
The common feature among most family firms is the fact that the ownership is closely 
tied to a group of people - the family. The family usually involves in the direct 
management of the firm. As indicated in the brief literature survey above the role of  4
families and other large blockholders controlling listed companies is controversial. As 
elsewhere, in Greece the family ownership can be an effective mechanism of 
monitoring or yet another obstacle to corporate change and a source of inefficiency. 
The main problem of the family-owned companies is the danger that power be exerted 
at the expense of the minority shareholders. Hence, the discussion on corporate 
governance (CG) in Greece focuses mainly on protecting individual and minority 
shareholders' interests that are practically isolated from the decision making process 
of the firm. The notion of CG was first introduced in Greece in 1998 through an 
introductory paper published by the ASE. A series of conferences and discussions led, 
then, to the adoption of a voluntary code of conduct in 1999, initiated by the Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission (HCMC) in collaboration with all relevant agents in the 
Greek economy. A major contribution during 2000 to the enhancement of 
transparency and disclosure regarding the behavior of listed companies in the capital 
market has been the enactment of HCMC rule: "A code of conduct for companies 
listed in the ASE and their affiliated persons" (HCMC Rule 5/204/2000).In May 2002 
the Ministry of the Economy amended the corporate law and incorporated 
fundamental CG obligations
4. The legislative framework of the Greek capital market 
is now fully harmonised with the guidelines and directives of the EU. In August 2001 
the Federation of Greek Industries (FGI) introduced the Principles of Corporate 
Governance for all companies, but especially for the companies listed on the ASE. 
Although improvements in CG have occurred in Greece, they are mainly confined to a 
small number of large listed companies that are more in tune with the international 
corporate stage  (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; Spanos 2004).  
 
The developments of the capital market  
 
The upgrading of the Greek capital market to mature market status and the global 
competition for capital has boosted the CG debate in Greece. The Greek capital 
market has been transformed largely during the last four years. New markets were 
established and the HCMC completed a wide range of institutional changes. HCMC's 
regulatory activities were mainly directed at the protection of investors, the 
enhancement of market transparency, the protection of the systems of trading and 
clearing, the enactment of codes of conduct and the assurance of the smooth function 
of the capital market (Spanos, 2004).  
 
One should also be reminded of the recent experience of the Greek capital market. In 
particular, the Greek capital market experienced a cycle of self-fulfilling expectations 
during the second and third quarters of 1999. The massive entrance of individual and 
institutional investors in the capital market, mostly through placements on small-and-
medium-capitalization stock rapidly, increased both stock prices and liquidity. The 
cycle of self-fulfilling expectations resulted in a significant divergence between actual 
prices and prices justified by corporate fundamentals (equilibrium prices). However, 
the bubble phase always has an end. The Greek capital market's severe 
underperformance in 2000, 2001 and 2002 largely resulted from the previous 
speculative process. The ASE General Index realized an annual decrease of 38.8% in 
2000, 23.5% in 2001 and 32.5% in 2002. Both the total value of transactions and the 
ASE capitalization decreased. In 2002, the total values of transaction in the ASE 
decreased by 38.9% and 85.7% in relation to 2001 and 1999 respectively. Total 
                                                         
4 The amendment of corporate law opened a huge controversy between the representatives of the 
industrial federations and the state.   5
market capitalization during 2002 amounted to €65,759.7 millions showing a decrease 
of 47.4% and 66.7% in relation to 2001 and 1999 respectively. The speculative events 
in the Greek capital market during 1999 led the HCMC and the state to take an active 
role, introducing rules, regulations and codes of conduct. All these measures aimed at 
the protection of investors against market abuse, the improvement of the transparency 
of the market and the establishment of appropriate business ethics. Good CG is seen 
as an important tool in this context (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; Spanos, 2004; 
Mertzanis, 2001).    
 
 
Table 1: The growth of the capital market in Greece, 1997 - 2002  




Market capitalization  Fund raised through 
IPO’s Year  
Amount  % change  Amount  % change % of 
GDP




1997  17,081.4 - 28,793.3 - 29.6  59.0  -  58.5 
1998  41,708.1 144.2 67,024.8 132.8  63.6 1,157.2 1,861.4  85.1 
1999  173,027.0 314.9 197,537.0 194.7 169.4 1,840.0 59.0  102.2 
2000  101,675.7 -41.2 117,956.3 -40.3 95.5  2,557.8 39.01  -38.8 
2001  40,529.8 -60.1 96,949.5 -17.8 74.1 1,075.6  -137.8 -23.5 
2002  24,771.0 -38.9 65,759.7 -47.4 46.9  92.5  -1,062.8 -32.5 
Source: Athens Stock Exchange, Hellenic Capital Market Commission  
 
 
Ownership structure and disclosure   
 
Ownership dispersion in Greece is considered as middle to low. Greece presented 
high concentration of ownership among the French civil law countries, with 67 per 
cent average ownership concentration
5 (La Porta et al., 1999). According to a recent 
study of the HCMC (2001), in 370 listed companies in Greece average ownership 
dispersion was 47.22% when the major shareholder is defined as the shareholder 
owning at least 5 per cent
6. In total, according to the study, the 370 listed companies 
were held by 974 major shareholders, while the major shareholders per listed 
company were 3. The results indicate that competition for control at the company 
level is low. Large families usually control most of the small-and-medium-sized 
companies and members of the controlling families are usually serving as the top 
manager. Large shareholders may act as an effective monitoring mechanism of 
management and, thereby, enhance firm performance. However, controlling 
blockholders can use their power to extract own private benefits, at the expense of 
minority shareholders. This kind of expropriation leads to sub-optimal levels of 
investment by minority. Therefore, the agency problem arises as a conflict between 
"strong blockholders and weak minority owners", rather than between "strong 
managers and weak owners".  
 
                                                         
5 In order to construct measures of ownership concentration La Porta et. al. (1999) the authors took, for 
each country, the average and the median ownership stake of the three largest shareholders among its 
ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms. 
6 Dispersion is calculated 35.7 per cent when the major shareholder is defined as the shareholder 




Table 2: Ownership dispersion of the ASE listed companies  
 














dispersion  48.74% 30.42% 25.05%  47.22%  54.04%  44.40% 
Number of major 
shareholders*  653 317  4 974  52  101 
Capitalization (mil 
of €)  91,500 8,204  46  99,750 55,411  15,630 
Source: Hellenic Capital Market Commission, Research Division (2001) www.hcmc.gr  
* Shareholders owning a stake of at least 5% of the company's share capital  
 
 
The corporate governance rating methodology   
 
The target of the study was to develop a methodology on corporate governance (CG) 
rating and apply it to a broad number of companies on a voluntary basis (Tsipouri and 
Xanthakis, 2004). To compare family and non-family firms performance we applied 
the ratings of "CG rating methodology for the ASE listed companies"
7 (Tsipouri and 
Xanthakis; 2004, Xanthakis et al., 2003). Specific targets were: 
 
-  To provide an independent and reliable tool for all investors who believe that a 
thorough examination of CG practices will lead to increased long-term 
shareholder value. 
-  To provide a comprehensive and specific rating regarding all CG criteria for each 
company, enabling firms to use their individual results in order to measure 
themselves against several benchmarks (high, average, sectoral average). 
-  To produce useful results of aggregated data for the relevant authorities (e.g. the 
ASE, the HCMC) and create an aggregate score for the Greek listed companies 
participating, thus demonstrating strengths and weaknesses to be taken into 
account for policy making.  
-  Form a basis for comparison with future exercises and offer a tool that will allow 
correlation of the results with stock value and profitability to check the extent to 
which investors pay a premium for companies with high ratings. 
 
The methodology consisted in the creation of a questionnaire reflecting the five 
chapters of the Greek CG voluntary code, which basically replicate the structure of 
the OECD principles (1999). The answers to this questionnaire were integrated into a 
number of indicators, which did not have a 1 : 1 correspondence to the questions. The 
indicators were then assigned with weightings, depending on their priority, so that a 
composite final overall score could be obtained. More specifically the questionnaire 
consisted of five main category-indicators: 
 
-  The rights and obligations of shareholders. 
                                                         
7 A project funded by the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE).   7
-  Transparency, disclosure of information and auditing. 
-  The board of directors.  
- Executive  management.   
-  Corporate governance commitment, the role of stakeholders and corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
The total number of questions was 54, categorised into questions, which directly lead 
to indicators suitable for the CG rating (32 questions), questions combined into one 
indicator (16 questions leading to five indicators only) and questions used for 
clarification and control not leading to any indicator (six questions). Of the former 32, 
five questions received ipso facto the highest score because they refer to issues that 
are mandatory in the existing regulatory framework. The reason the latter were 
included was to show potential international investors that all listed firms in the Greek 
market comply with these minimum standards. The questions were thus integrated 
into 37 indicators, of which six were for shareholder rights, nine for transparency, 12 
for the Board, five for the CEO and the executives and five for general issues like 
corporate social responsibility.  
 
Weighting was the greatest difficulty, as it inevitably had to include subjective 
judgements. The way we proceeded was to first have each of the senior members of 
the research team individually assign priorities amongst and within each category. 
Fortunately, their assigned priorities coincided to a large degree, and where they did 
not, agreement could be reached after discussion. Then, a score of 0 (inadequate), 1 
(intermediate) and 2 (top performance) was assigned per indicator. These weightings 
were presented to the Advisory Committee and were confirmed or altered to reflect 
the priorities and the evaluation of the participants in the market. 
 
Our results are based on a sample of 120 listed companies, which together represent 
more than 90 per cent of the capitalisation of the market. We broke down the sample 
into two categories: family firms (80.8 per cent of the total sample) and non-family 
firms (19.2 per cent of the total sample). We take family firms to include all 
enterprises that are owned, managed and influenced by a family or families. The 
collaboration with the ASE helped to “open doors” more easily, because it ensured 
that the confidentiality clause was taken seriously. 
 
The results for individual companies were not published or made publicly available. 
The benefit to the companies rated is that they received and discussed their own 
individual ratings with the researchers and could compare them with the average and 
use them as a benchmark for future improvements (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004). 
 
 
The structure and processes of corporate governance in family firms: 
presentation of results  
 
The total rating results shown in Table 3 indicated that family firms received lower 
scores compared to the non-family firms. The highest compliance in the Greek 
market, including family firms scoring, is in the category of shareholders' rights, 
followed by transparency (CEO/Executive management for the family firms) and 
CEO/Executive management (transparency for the family firms). Board of directors 
had a medium compliance score, while very low score appears in the last category  8
which incorporate corporate governance (CG) commitment and corporate social 
responsibility issues (e.g. environmental awareness and stakeholders' interests).        
 





% (no. 120) 
Family firms, 








The rights and the obligations 
of shareholders  90.9 89.8 95.4  92.8 
Transparency, disclosure of 
information and auditing  71.9 68.9 83.9  75.3 
The board of directors  67.3 64.2 78.5  71.2 
CEO and executive 
management   71.8 70.5 76.5  75.0 
Corporate governance 
commitment, the role of 
stakeholders and corporate 
social responsibility 
30.4 27.8 43.8  35.1 
Total CG index  70.3 68.4 78.1  73.7 
 
 
However, the spread in scores between family firms and non-family firms and 
between family firms and those of the ASE General Index companies vary across 
categories. The impact of mandatory provisions resulted on high convergence both 
between family and non-firms and family and ASE Index firms. It came as no surprise 
that the spread is considerably increasing in the CG commitment/Corporate social 
responsibility category. In addition, the spreads in scores between the family firms 
and the non-family and ASE Index sub-sample were found to be quite large in " the 
board of directors" (directors' independence, board committees establishment) and 
"transparency" (application of International Accounting Standards, risk management).    
 
 
Table 4: Spread in scores between family & non-family firms and 






family firms (%) 
Spread between 
family & ASE 
Index firms (%) 
The rights and the obligations 
of shareholders  5.6 3.0 
Transparency, disclosure of 
information and auditing  15.0 6.4 
The board of directors  14.3 7.0 
CEO and executive 
management   6.0 4.5 
Corporate governance 
commitment, the role of 
stakeholders and corporate 
social responsibility 
16.0 7.3 
Total CG index  9.7 5.3  9
 
 
Shareholders rights appear to be well protected in Greece (Table 5). The one-share, 
one-vote rule is legally imposed and any shareholder can be represented at the general 
meeting by a special authorised agent, who will be either a spouse or another 
shareholder of the company. Family firms follow the framework defined by law 
regarding the timing and the range of issues submitted to the annual general meeting. 
What seems to be weak in the family firms is their internal organisation. Primarily as 
a matter of cost there are still family-owned listed companies without an effective 
autonomous shareholder department. Moreover, the use of modern technology (e.g. e-
mail, website) as an information mechanism is not sufficiently used by many family-
owned firms. The authorisation to vote by tele-transmission, including the Internet, is 
basically a problem attributed to the legal framework.      
 





% (no. 120) 
Family firms, 








The equal treatment of 
shareholders  100.0 100.0 100.0  100 
Absence of takeover defense  99.1 100.0 96.0  97.4 
Existence of  organized and 
autonomous shareholder 
department  
85.4 81.3  100.0  91.0 
Voting procedures in the GMS  98.1 98.8 96.0  97.4 
Mechanisms of sufficient and 
timely information about the 
dates, place and agenda of the 
GMS 
83.3 81.3 91.0  85.9 
Mechanisms through which 
shareholders are sufficiently 
and timely informed on the 
proposals submitted in the 
agenda of the GMS 
83.5 82.2 89.0  86.5 
Total index  90.9 89.8 95.4  92.8 
 
The disclosure framework in Greece is quite strong and in line with the EU trends 
(Table 6). The enactment of HCMC rule: "A code of conduct for companies listed in 
the Athens Stock Exchange and their affiliated persons" (HCMC Rule 5/204/2000) 
sets behavior standards for listed companies and specifies duties and obligations of 
companies' major shareholders, the members of the board of directors, the executive 
management or other individuals or legal entities related to them. The aim is to 
eliminate uncertainty in the market on corporate affairs and avoid speculation by 
company insiders or other persons that may have insider information (equal treatment 
of all investors). The weak points of the family-owned firms are associated with 
accounting practices and risk management. Family firms provide their balance sheet 
statements in accordance with the Greek accounting principles and rarely with the 
IAS. However, the statutory provisions are in the process of being amended. The large 
majority of family firms do not have appropriate systems to handle issues of risk 
exposure and risk management. Only banks and internationally quoted companies 
have taken some steps toward ensuring appropriate risk management systems. Finally,  10
the disclosure of managerial remuneration declared to be a deliberate policy, even by 
the best scoring (large non-family) companies, in line with local norms and protecting 
their executives from exposure
8.   
 





% (no. 120) 
Family firms, 








Report of the annual and semi-
annual financial statements  
with clear and understandable 
way 
100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
In time publish of the annual 
and semi-annual financial 
statement 
100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Equal treatment of all 
investors and financial 
analysts regarding information 
dissemination (fair disclosure) 
for important corporate events 
100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Detailed analysis of any 
deviation from previously 
announced earnings targets 
and strategic goal 
93.4 95.2 88.0  92.3 
Application of an 
internationally recognized 
accounting and auditing 
system for the balance sheet 
consistent with the IAS 
19.8 8.4 64.0  33.3 
Disclosure of board directors 
and executive staff members 
remuneration 
50.5 50.0 52.0  48.7 
Specific discussion of the 
company’s risk management 
system on the annual report 
19.8 8.4 64.0  28.2 
Agreement between external 
and internal auditors on 
important focus area of the 
audit 
95.3 94.0  100.0  100.0 
Total index  71.9 68.9 83.9  75.3 
 
As observed in the results of Table 7, family firms are "undergoverned" in terms of 
board of directors. Typically, the principal shareholder often serves as the CEO or 
chairman of the board and has the decisive vote in major corporate decisions. Even 
when the separation of the chair and CEO functions is the case, the two roles are 
usually interconnected. Board structures and operations are poor. External influences, 
from the independent non-executive directors in family firms are not so powerful, 
even though the law (3016/2002) now requires that all listed companies have at least 
two independent non-executive directors. Most boards in family-owned firms have a 
majority of related directors, usually coming from the family. Independent director 
                                                         
8 Listed companies have to include in the notes of the accounts details of the compensation paid to the 
members of the board of directors and of the management during the last financial year. No distinction, 
however, is made as to the nature of the compensation.   11
attendance at board meetings is not adequate. Making corporate boards more 
independent and effective is a huge challenge in family firms. They also score very 
low in the establishment of board committees. The committee most commonly 
encountered on Greek boards is the audit committee. The family, on a more informal 
arena exercises strategic decision-making processes, through private interaction 
between the most influential actors. Many family firms confirm also that they do not 
have a formal orientation program for new directors. A note-worthy feature is that 
Greek firms seem to have a universal problem in the frequency of changing non-
executive directors. Finally, it came as no surprise that domestic family control 
significantly reduces board size. 
 
 





% (no. 120) 
Family firms, 








Division between the role 
of the chairman and the 
CEO 
52.8 53.0 48.0  43.6 
Succession plan  77.8 77.7 80.0  88.5 
The composition of the 
board of directors   59.9 50.0 96.0  66.7 
Non-executive board 
directors' independence   60.9 54.3 72.0  56.5 
Existence of specified rules 
regarding board operations 
and duties 
100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
The size of the board of 
directors  94.3 98.8 80.0  92.3 
Board meetings frequency   100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
Establishment of board 
committees   17.5 11.7 41.0  29.5 
Sufficient access of the non-
executive directors to the 
company’s executive 
management  
88.2 85.5 98.0  93.6 
New board member’s 
rotation and training 
procedure 
59.9 59.0 66.0  56.4 
Non-executive board 




0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Total index  67.3 64.2 78.5  71.2 
 
 
Table 8, indicating ratings of the CEO and executive management, shows that the 
family firms underperform non-family firms in all the categories. The liability of the 
CEO, according to the Greek law, is much stricter than that of other senior managers 
of board members. The major weaknesses lie in not having performance-pay schemes  12
for the executive management and in not having the position of Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO). Disclosure of share ownership information of the executive managers 
seems to be a universal problem.        
 
 





% (no. 120) 
Family firms, 








The duties and 




47.6 45.2 60.0  55.1 
Disclosure (in the GMS 
and/or in the company’s 
annual report) of share 
ownership information of 
the executive management 
staff members 
43.9 42.8 44.0  42.3 
CEO’s election frequency   99.5 99.4  100.0  100.0 
Existence of position of 
Chief Financial Officer   79.2 78.3 84.0  87.2 
Total index  71.8 70.5 76.5  75.0 
 
 
The degree of compliance is very low in the final CG indicator for both family and 
non-family firms, as suggested by Table 9. Family firms do not have their own 
specific corporate governance guidelines and do not make a clear statement of their 
own commitment towards environment. However, family-controlled firms are 
encouraging long lasting relationships in local communities with different 
stakeholders and are usually responding to their specific needs. It is also worth to 
mention that a Greek network of socially responsible companies was created and the 




Table 9: Corporate governance commitment, the role of stakeholders and 





% (no. 120) 
Family firms, 








Existence of written CG 
rules in the company  12.7 7.2 38.0  23.1 
Easy availability of the 
company’s CG rules to the 
stakeholders 
1.9 1.2  12.0  2.6 
Existence of a Corporate 
Governance Committee or  15.6 12.7 32.0  24.4  13
individual entrusted with 
CG compliance issues 
Existence of an efficient CG 
framework taking account 
the interests of all 
stakeholders 




84.4 82.5 92.0  84.6 
Total index  30.4 27.8 43.8  35.1 
 
 
Conclusions and issues for further investigation    
The main conclusion from this paper is that the family firms are demonstrated poor 
governance compared with non-family firms and the ASE Index companies. There are 
many weaknesses that threaten family firms: not having appropriate risk management 
systems; not following appropriate norms of company board structure and 
management (e.g. directors' independence, board committees' establishment, CFO 
position); lacking CG commitment; confusing family matters and business matters 
and so on. On the other hand, there are some family firms that are successful in 
having good governance practices (e.g. recruit competent and independent board 
members, employ professional managers on influential positions, and develop internal 
CG guidelines). Having good governance practice will build confidence among 
capital providers (e.g. potential investors) allowing greater access to capital. The 
crucial question, hence, is how can family firms make this critical transition? Outsider 
experts, like competent independent directors and qualified managers, will facilitate 
the transition. Hiring and promotion decisions must be made professionally by family 
owner. Facing this challenge family-run firms facilitate also another key-issue: 
management succession (Zafft, 2003). As the business grows, finding sufficient and 
competent managers and experience within the family becomes harder. Corporate 
governance structures can put in place fair decision-making and monitoring 
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